This article discusses the emergence in the late 1990s of an innovative conceptualization of security that proclaims the global HIV/AIDS epidemic a threat to international peace and stability. The study provides a framework for understanding the securitization of the HIV/AIDS epidemic as an international norm defined and promoted mainly by multilateral bodies, powerful states in the North and transnational HIV/AIDS advocacy networks. The HIV/AIDS securitization norm (HASN) is an attempt of the present analysis to synthesize under a single analytical concept the myriad of ideas and international prescriptions about HIV/AIDS interventions. The article identifies the actors who developed the main strategic prescriptions of the HASN and the transnational mechanisms that promoted the diffusion of its concepts throughout the state system.
defined and promoted mainly by multilateral bodies, powerful states in the North and transnational HIV/AIDS advocacy networks. 1 The HIV/AIDS securitization norm (from now on HASN) is an intellectual attempt of the present article to synthesize under a single analytical concept the myriad of ideas and international prescriptions about HIV/AIDS interventions.
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The HASN is analytically divided here into two integrated parts: 1) one that defines the idea of HIV/AIDS as a security issue, which presupposes rights and obligations (norm);
and 2) one that prescribes the right policies to be implemented in the international, regional and national levels to combat the threat posed by the epidemic (rule). In this respect, one can say that the (international) norm is deterministic in terms of defining a supposedly unique and uncontested understanding of what the HIV/AIDS epidemic is and also normative in the sense of knowing what are the good policies to be put in place by states.
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The following discussion explores the theoretical and empirical foundations of the HASN. Specifically, it investigates some analytical advantages for the present study in linking the constructivist literature on the emergence and diffusion of international norms with the securitization framework of Buzan, Waever and De Wilde (1998) . It also assesses the empirical contributions of the HASN to the theoretical debate on how pre-existing normative orders, political structures and agents condition the domestic reception of international norms. The article then identifies the conceptual basis of the HASN, its empirical origins, the actors who develop its main strategic prescriptions and the transnational mechanisms that promote the diffusion of its concepts throughout the state system.
theoretical Perspectives on Norm Formation and the Securitization Debate
This section aims to bring together in a single analytical framework some of the theoretical contributions made by the securitization framework and constructivist scholarship on norm formation and diffusion. It explores the analytical advantages that such a merger could offer to the understanding of the HASN.
Fundamentally, constructivist scholarship on international norms focuses on the mechanisms by which ideas emerge and spread. This school is divided into two interrelated perspectives. 4 The first research agenda looks primarily at the system level (Finnemore 1993; Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) . It focuses on how international norms emerge and the means of their propagation in the international system.
This perspective is also interested in the actors who embrace and promote these norms.
They focus on the role of transnational social movements, multilateral institutions and states as teachers of norms.
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Those attempting to institutionalize the securitization of new threats, as in the case of transnational advocacy networks (Greenpeace is a good example, concerning environmental issues), in general have to face resistance from an international political context still dominated by traditional security institutions. The degree of either confrontation or adequacy towards these securitization moves can vary greatly, depending on the characteristics of the political setting (either multilateral, regional or national) in which securitization is attempted (Buzan, Waever, and Wilde 1998, 29) .
International norms can assume various forms and most of them fall in the realm of politicization. This means that they are in general part of normal public debate and policy decision-making and do not represent an urgent matter requiring actions outside usual political procedures. However, depending on circumstantial changes, issues can be moved further up the list of policy priorities, requiring a special kind of politics and greater allocation of human and material resources. As shown later, the HIV/AIDS epidemic is an interesting example, whereby an issue has been gradually moved from the politicized to the securitized category. In this sense, one can say that the process of constituting international security norms is analogous to the image of a pendulum that swings from politicization to securitization and vice-versa in terms of the perceived levels of urgency and threat that are allocated to a specific issue. In the case of HIV/AIDS, the pendulum has already swung from politicization to securitization and, as long as the disease is eventually controlled, it can move back to the sphere of politicization.
Given the above considerations, this article proposes that the explanation of the cognitive process by which issues in the transnational system are moved from the category of normality to emergency and back, is the most compelling contribution of the securitization framework to the study of how international security norms emerge and spread. In this respect, securitization theory fills an important gap in the literature on international norms, that is, the lack of interest in the strategic social construction of threats to international security. Consistent with the view put forward by the Copenhagen group, in general, and Buzan, Waever, and Wilde (1998) , in particular, this study argues that, through the use of rhetorical practices (speech-act) as well as other forms of persuasion, HASN entrepreneurs promoted change in pre-existing interpretations about the HIV/AIDS global epidemic. As further elaborated in the following section, these actors successfully re-framed the disease from an early bio-medical issue to the current immediate threat to global security.
However, despite its relevance to the present discussion, securitization scholarship has, at least, two very important shortcomings: firstly, while digging deep into the theoretical puzzle, Buzan and his followers neglect the empirical verification of actual processes whereby issues, after being successfully securitized in the realm of discursive practices (speech-act), become widely embedded in transnational institutions and states'
bureaucracies. I empirically address this analytical gap in the forthcoming appraisal of the global securitization of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.
A second related problem concerns these authors' lack of conceptual tools to understand the impact of externally induced securitization processes on pre-existing regional and domestic systems. This kind of criticism was first raised by authors (Balzacq 2005; Stritzel 2005 ) who pointed to the need for proper social contextualization in the analysis of processes of securitization. Notwithstanding their emphasis on the role of social power and facilitating conditions (1998, (31) (32) (33) , Buzan, Waever, and Wilde do not satisfactorily elaborate on the interplay between the autonomous linguistic practices of securitization and the structured social and power contexts in which these practices take place. Instead, they centre the analysis almost exclusively on the subjective practices of discourse, therefore missing the strategic environmental factors that deeply influence them.
This article claims that these conceptual tools are better provided by the abovementioned "second wave" constructivist scholarship on international norms. This literature maintains that states and regional institutions do not react in the same manner to externally induced/imposed normative frameworks. Rather, their particular domestic and regional contexts condition their reception by governments and regional institutions alike.
Within this research agenda, a number of important factors have been shown to condition the domestic incorporation of international norms. They have argued that variations in the domestic adaptation of international norms can be explained by the distinctive features of local actors' principled beliefs and cognitive identities, as well as by the (mis) match between the prescriptions of international norms and states' political structures.
Peter Gourevitch (1978) , for example, has usefully demonstrated, in his influential analysis of the role played by domestic structures in mediating the effects of systemic pressures, that some actors have more access than others to policy discussions due to the particular institutional configurations of the decision-making process. Other authors have explored a number of similar issues. These are the causal link between the ability of international norms to influence state behaviour and the different configurations of state-society relations (Risse 1994) , the congruence between international norms and pre-existing political cultures (Checkel 1999) , the processes wherein domestic groups instrumentally appeal to international norms to further their own local interests (Cortell and Davis Jr. 1996) , and the processes by which international norms reconstitute national interests (Klotz 1995 Companies, backed by powerful states, are exploiting (one could also say securitizing) the epidemic exclusively to achieve financial gains.
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The South African government's ideological resistance to HASN entrepreneurship in the country clearly illustrates how a cultural mismatch (Checkel 1999 ) between external and internal understandings about the epidemic's impact can hamper the process of successfully transmitting the HIV/AIDS securitization norm from the international to the domestic sphere. In South Africa, this conflictive encounter between international normative understandings (securitization) and local belief systems and practices (de-securitization) resulted in sustained domestic resistance to the internationally prescribed securitization of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 11 The remainder of this article seeks to find empirical support for the theoretical assumptions put forward here.
the Origins and Substance of the HiV/AiDS Securitisation Norm (HASN) a. HiV/AiDS and security: setting the debate
The following analysis focuses on the concept of security and the current understandings of its relationship with the HIV/AIDS epidemic. It describes the ideational changes in the definitions and referent objects of security since the early 1980s and how HIV/AIDS became part of this academic and policy debate.
The notion of security in international relations is a contentious one. It is muddled by a plethora of unresolved debates about its actual meaning. These debates can be divided into two main groups. The first is made up of scholars who interpret security mostly as national or state security, which basically means fear from military threats from states against other states. This school in security studies is deeply rooted in the realist tradition of international relations (e.g., Carr 1939; Morgenthau 1948) . The realist understanding of the national security problem is well exemplified by the widely acknowledged idea of the security dilemma (Herz 1950) . This is the notion that the security needs of one state will necessarily lead to the insecurity of other states, as each interprets the behaviour of others as potentially dangerous (Buzan 1991, 14) . For realists, the international system is anarchic, signifying the lack of a central authority restraining state behaviour. In this rather unstable external environment, states will inevitably develop military capabilities to protect themselves.
This largely pessimistic view of security is shared by contemporary neorealist authors such as Kenneth Waltz (1979) and John Mearsheimer (1990) , who envisage balance of power politics as the permanent structural feature of the international system (Baylis 2005, 302) . 12 Kenneth Waltz, in particular, had a profound impact in the area of security studies. His neorealist theory argues that the structural characteristics of the international state system mould state behaviour. According to Waltz, states are the most important analytical units in international relations. For him, the ultimate goal of states is self-preservation, "since no one can be relied on to do it for them" (Waltz 1979, 109) . In this sense, he argues that "the units of an anarchic system are functionally undifferentiated. The units of such an order are then distinguished primarily by their greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks" (p. 97). This means that the structure of a particular system is defined by the distribution of capabilities among like units rather than through differences in their character and functions (p. 98). In Waltz's formulation, security can only be achieved through balancing the power capabilities of the most important units in the system.
Since the early 1980s, however, the neorealist conceptualisation of inter-state security relations has been challenged by a growing number of writers who argued for an alternative understanding of security (Buzan 1991; Ullman 1983; Waever, Jahn, and Lemaitre 1987; Tickner 1992; Buzan, Waever, and Wilde 1998 the inhabitants of a state and/or narrows the policy options available to the government of a state or a non-governmental entity (1983, 133) . Following the same trend, Barry Buzan (1991) made analytically clear the distinction between economic, political, environmental, social and military security threats that could affect states and non-state actors alike. He also delineated the security dynamics at three inter-related levels: the individual, the state and the system.
13
The introduction of this new security agenda in academic works was accompanied by a strong tendency in the wake of the end of the Cold War to shift the referent object of security from states to individuals. The United Nations was at the forefront of these developments. In 1992, following a request from the Security Council, the UN SecretaryGeneral, Boutros Boutros-Ghali produced the first of a series of influential documents aiming to address the changing international security order. Boutros-Ghali's An Agenda for Peace outlined the rationale and methods for moving away from the Cold War's conceptualisation of state security towards a closer focus on the security of individuals.
The subsequent emergence of the human security perspective is intrinsically linked with the principles and themes initially developed in An Agenda for Peace. It focuses on a broad understanding of security that encompasses not only the security of states against external or internal armed threats, but also the security of people living within states against non-military threats, such as disease, environmental degradation, economic and social instability etc. While breaking down state security into many subcategories, this perspective shifted the levels of analysis from states and the inter-state system to societies and individuals within and across states.
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The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) was the first organisation to officially champion the human security perspective. The UNDP launched the concept of human security in 1994 through its Human Development Report. It lists several categories in which human security can be at risk, such as food security, economic security, personal security, community security and political security. Subsequently, the UNDP proposed a series of measures to institutionalise the concept, such as the formulation of a world social charter, the creation of a global human security fund, the recommendation of global taxes for resource mobilisation and the establishment of an Economic Security Council (UNDP 1994, 24-25) . Following the lead of the UNDP, other international bodies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have adopted the concept of human security in their policy frameworks. In addition, a number of governments have also embraced the concept when defining their national security policies -Canada and Norway being pioneers in this regard.
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HIV/AIDS clearly falls into this latter categorisation of security, which led to the adoption of this broad perspective by a wide range of governments, multilateral agencies and academics. This group has raised questions concerning the economic impact of the disease at the community and family levels, how the epidemic is creating millions of orphans, whether it can become a threat to food security, how it contributes to crime and the implications of the epidemic to governance and economic development (Kristofferson 2000; Elbe 2001; Piot 2001; Fourie and Schonteich 2001; Chen 2003; Leen 2004 ). There have also been a number of academic studies and policy reports addressing the epidemic within the more traditional framework of security. Generally, this literature explores the indirect impact that HIV/AIDS could have on the territorial security and integrity of (mostly Western) states.
The issues examined in this regard include, for example, whether high prevalence rates can constitute a threat to the national security of regimes friendly to the West, therefore requiring external intervention. They also assess whether economic and social burdens associated with HIV/AIDS could cause further domestic and regional instability in areas already characterised by entrenched conflict, and whether new strands of the HIV virus could penetrate Western societies (Heinecken 2000; National Intelligence Council (NIC) 2000; Price-Smith 2001 Singer 2002; Elbe 2003; Fidler 2003; De Waal 2003; Prins 2004; Garrett 2005; Ostergard 2002) . 16 Some of these scholarly studies and policy reports explore the implications of HIV/AIDS on the readiness of national armed forces with high HIV prevalence rates (Mills 2000; Elbe 2002) , 17 and how international peacekeeping operations can serve as an important vector for further spreading HIV in the emergency areas where these forces are deployed (Tripodi and Patel 2002; Elbe 2003) .
What this amounts to is a two-tier perception of the security implications of the epidemic. At one level, the referent objects are individuals and societies, whereas in the other, states and the international system are seen as the main analytical focus. The human security approach in general accuses the traditional perspective of focusing exclusively on a narrow state-centric understanding of the security implications of HIV/AIDS that frequently ignores the well-being of people both affected and infected by the epidemic. In turn, traditionalist security theorists charge the human security approach of losing focus and expanding the concept too widely, thus neglecting very important questions about the impact of the epidemic on state institutions and governance (Ostergard 2002; Elbe 2001) .
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This article claims that these two tiers are not divorced from each other. It argues that the variations in meaning between human and national security approaches to HIV/AIDS indicate the presence of different mental models or road maps (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 13 ) within a common worldview about the existential threat posed by the epidemic. This shared broad notion about the security threat posed by HIV/AIDS is what defines this group as a particular epistemic community (Haas 1992) . According to Haas, epistemic communities provide crucial information to policymakers by interpreting problems and offering solutions to these problems (1992, 4) . However, they are not a monolithic bloc in which all members What is important for an epistemic community is that members share a general worldview of a problem. With regard to this article's case, their shared belief that HIV/AIDS is an emergency threat does not necessarily translate into identical interpretations about how to deal with it and who is targeted by the threat (either states or human beings).
Moreover, this broader worldview is often based on feeble empirical evidence. Barnett and Prins (2006) , for example, have raised interesting questions about the reliability of the evidence presented in some of the studies about HIV/AIDS and security. They point to serious problems in terms of poor data collection and the pervasiveness in some analysis of "factoids", meaning "soft opinions that have hardened into fact" (2006, 18) . These authors' analysis shed some light on the social construction of reality concerning the links between HIV/AIDS and security. This means that in the case of HIV/AIDS, the interaction between the various discursive articulations (or speech-acts) about the security impact of the epidemic is what really makes HIV/AIDS a security issue rather than any identifiable objective fact.
In the light of the above, it is argued here that the human and national security perspectives on HIV/AIDS represent two general tendencies that the present study attempts to convey in a single analytical concept, HASN. As shown later, this is done by examining how these intellectual developments around the ideas of national and human security are translated in terms of international norms and practices through the work of states, transnational networks and international organizations, notably the US and the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). The epistemic community of scholars with an interest in the security aspects of HIV/AIDS is just one of the many providers and carriers of knowledge about the epidemic's security impact. In this respect, the creation of a strong discourse clamouring for the global securitisation of HIV/AIDS is the result of the interaction between powerful players involved in the epidemic's policy arena. The question of who they are and how they are connected to each other, as well as with their respective audiences, plays a fundamental role in understanding the securitisation of the epidemic. It is important, therefore, to understand the ideational and political process by which those actors have successfully re-conceptualised HIV/AIDS to signify security.
The following demonstrates how those securitising actors/norm leaders used both national and human security arguments to spread the idea that, because HIV/AIDS threatens the security/survival of a referent object (either states or human beings), the epidemic should be treated as a special kind of emergency. As shown next, the new theorising about the security impact of the global HIV/AIDS epidemic, coupled with the growing acknowledgment of its multidimensional and destructive impact, promoted a turn in the way the epidemic would be responded to. At this stage, the aforementioned pendulum started to swing steadily towards the securitisation pole. This section discerns how the above conceptualisation of the links between HIV/ AIDS and security translated into actual political moves to securitize the epidemic. It unfolds the historical process whereby the HASN emerged and, after reaching a "tipping point" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) , cascaded throughout the international system. The (un) successful internalisation of this international norm by states critically affected by the epidemic is assessed later through an analysis of its incorporation into the domestic structures of Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa.
The first notified cases of AIDS in the world occurred in 1981 among young gay men in New York (Hymes, Greene, and Marcus 1981) . In the early 1980s in the US, the HIV virus became primarily associated with homosexuals. The early association of the virus with this politically unpopular group led to indifference towards social movements demanding more assertive policy action from the US government. 19 This lack of urgency in dealing with the problem was reproduced internationally.
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the responses from multilateral agencies were directed exclusively to the biomedical aspects of the epidemic. These early efforts were fragmented and under-resourced. Nobody identified the new disease as a mounting global threat. The World Health Organization (WHO) was very slow in responding to HIV/AIDS. This was mostly due to the perception among WHO officials that AIDS was a disease of well-off minorities in the richest states in the world. By contrast, the WHO had been created to concentrate its resources on the provision of healthcare to poor populations in Third World countries (Iliffe 2006, 68) . In 1986, however, following the publication of alarming reports about growing HIV prevalence in several parts of Africa, the WHO began to address HIV/AIDS as a serious public health problem on a global scale. By this time, the WHO had established its Global Programme on AIDS (GPA) and advised governments to create surveillance systems and HIV/AIDS committees within their Ministries of Health. It also set up an HIV/AIDS department whose primary goal was to assist health ministries and governments to put in place national plans, through the provision of technical expertise, financial support and the centralisation of all the information about HIV/AIDS.
The WHO Global Programme on HIV/AIDS was the first multilateral initiative that was aimed at raising the profile of the epidemic as a public health issue of global importance.
It promoted a worldwide mobilisation of institutional and financial resources to deal with the epidemic. In its initial stages, GPA policy initiatives concentrated mainly on the promotion of public awareness, blood screening, condom distribution and prevention efforts. It was also perceived as a significant victory of (relatively) small states against the powerful economic interests of the North. For the first time in the history of trade negotiations, states were legally entitled to issue compulsory licences to copy patented drugs in case of health emergencies. These developments had a kind of emulative or cascading impact in the rest of the developing world (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) . Transnational advocacy networks began pressuring donor governments and multilateral agencies to give a renewed relevance to the provision of generic HIV/AIDS drugs as a core priority in the domestic national plans to combat the epidemic. 
c. the tri-dimensional character of the HASN
In order to enhance clarity, it is worthwhile at this point to be more specific about the content of the so-called HIV/AIDS securitisation norm. Basically, it has three interconnected dimensions. The first dimension is more subtle than the others and empirical detection is therefore more difficult. It concerns a broad subjective tendency in the international community to gradually move HIV/AIDS away from the area of "business as usual"
when dealing with public health issues. This is part of a progressive historical transition The unfolding of the securitization of AIDS follows a net-like deployment of biopower, as it is being simultaneously driven by a plethora of actors […] The net of the securitization of AIDS has been widely cast, corroborating Foucault's view that biopower is never solely the property of one agent; it is always plural, decentralized and capillary in nature. "Power", he reminded his readers, "is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere". (p. 407/408) What is interesting in Elbe's transposition of biopower to illuminate the securitisation of HIV/AIDS is that it allows for a holistic understanding of the securitisation process.
Rather than being solely the activity of isolated securitising actors performing speech-acts, the securitisation process is seen through these lenses in the form of a chain of events and actors, or something that historically mutates and evolves into something else. In line with Elbe's biopolitical stance on the securitisation of HIV/AIDS, I argue that the historical and social construction of the disease eventually led to the creation of a hegemonic grammar that portrays the epidemic in terms of a special type of problem, which demands special institutions and policies.
In this sense, the securitisation of HIV/AIDS can be understood as a constitutive element of a larger hegemonic world order that encompasses long-term political, ethical, economic and ideological spheres of activity on a global scale. This is what Gramsci called a historic bloc (Gramsci 1971) . According to Robert W. Cox, in the historic bloc "there is an informal structure of influence reflecting the different levels of real political and economic power which underlies the formal procedures for decisions" (Cox 1993, 63) . After the successful institutionalisation of the hegemonic grammar of HIV/AIDS, as seen, for example, by the creation of UNAIDS and later by the adoption of the UNGASS Declaration, the utterance of security becomes less important, or simply epiphenomenal. The next step is the actual application of securitisation principles and policies. This relates to the second and third dimensions of the HASN. The second dimension is narrower than the first in the sense that it provides the actual conceptual framework which defines/frames HIV/AIDS as a special kind of global emergency. It may also be defined in terms of principled beliefs "that mediate between world views and particular policy conclusions" (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 9) . This was demonstrated earlier • Leadership: "Strong leadership at all levels of society is essential for an effective response to the epidemic".
• Prevention: "Prevention must be the mainstay of our response".
• Care, support and treatment: "Care, support and treatment are fundamental elements of an effective response".
• HIV/AIDS and human rights: "Realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all is essential to reduce vulnerability to HIV/AIDS".
• Reducing vulnerability: "The vulnerable must be given priority in the response".
• Children orphaned and made vulnerable by HIV/AIDS: "Children orphaned and affected by HIV/AIDS need special assistance".
• Alleviating social and economic impact: "To address HIV/AIDS is to invest in sustainable development".
• Research and development: "With no cure for HIV/AIDS yet found, further research and development is crucial".
• HIV/AIDS in conflict and disaster-affected regions: "Conflicts and disasters contribute to the spread of HIV/AIDS".
• Resources: "The HIV/AIDS challenge cannot be met without new, additional and sustained resources". 
The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) was launched in January

the "Norm Leaders": institutional Apparatus and Norm Diffusion a. UNAiDS
In the foreword to the UNAIDS 2004 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic, Peter 
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The present study argues that IOs, in general, and UNAIDS, in particular, embody elements of agency and structure pointed out by the two schools. It agrees with the constructivist assumption that the power of IOs derives from their capacity to produce autonomous knowledge and promote normative change. Since its creation, UNAIDS has led the global response to HIV/AIDS, defining new concepts and policy priorities that are adopted widely by states and non-state actors alike. In this sense, unlike the (neo) realists hold, UNAIDS's behaviour cannot be seen simply as the result of a compromise between its powerful member-states. Rather, it produces a kind of autonomous social/scientific interpretation that has been proved strong enough to suppress other competing views about the epidemic.
However, the powerful influence of the US at both the GF and UNAIDS confirms the (neo) realist presumption that the autonomy of IOs is constantly checked by narrow national interests. Since the election of George W. Bush, in 2000, the US government has pursued its own foreign policy agenda to deal with the global epidemic. As this article shows later, the main source of contention between the global HIV/AIDS polity and the US government is George Bush's President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the disruptions it has caused to the unified international front led by UNAIDS. Barnett and Finnemore (1999, p.713) observed that "having established rules and norms, IOs are eager to spread the benefits of their expertise and often act as conveyor belts of norms and models of good political behavior". It is interesting to note that the UNAIDS case is consistent with this assumption. Considering the diffusion of the HASN as an example, these conveyor belts correspond to the institutional mechanisms described above by which the UNAIDS Secretariat inculcates and enforces its norms globally. By December 2002, around 100 states had already set up National HIV/AIDS plans following recommendations from UNAIDS. Additionally, UNAIDS has helped 85 countries to establish National HIV/AIDS Councils. It has also supported these governments in the actual implementation of their national plans by assisting in many technical areas, such as the drafting of donor proposals, the process of integrating HIV/AIDS in broader development strategies and undertaking reviews that assess the progress of the national responses (UNAIDS 2004a, 5).
What the above suggests is that UNAIDS is a primary source of norm creation and diffusion by virtue of its widely recognized authority to orient and coordinate states and 
b. the US government
As demonstrated in the previous section, UNAIDS is a powerful actor in creating and promoting social knowledge about HIV/AIDS. It is not alone, though. The US government and its associate agencies also play a fundamental role in the process of creating international understandings about the epidemic. In shedding light on the US government's contribution to the formation of the HASN, one should first set the epidemic within the wider political context of US foreign policy at the beginning of the century.
At the heart of the foreign policy of the Bill Clinton administration was the problem (later resolved by the terrorist attacks of 9/11) of how to use the disproportional power of Conversely, the George W. Bush administration's response to the global epidemic reflected the logic of its own worldview. In this respect, any assessment of Bush's foreign policy towards HIV/AIDS necessarily has to deal with the subjective issue of how decision-makers see the role of the United States in the world and how the epidemic fits into it. Since the very beginning, the inner circle of Bush's foreign policy establishment was infused with the realist ideas of an elite of neo-conservative ideologues, on the one hand, and the President's own moral instincts, on the other. This merge between realism and morality turned into the ideological justification for a wide range of divisive policies (Wallis 2005) . 9/11 gave the Bush administration the opportunity to fully develop this new foreign policy thinking and to act on it. The pursuit of national security abroad was framed by the symbolic image of a battle between good and evil. The terrorist attacks re-ignited among foreign policy pundits the long-standing (yet, prior to 9/11, dormant) foreign policy principle of an alleged "American exceptionalism", i.e., the idea that, given the moral uniqueness and disproportional power of the US, God has delegated to its leaders the divine duty to protect and lead the world. In the words of Michael Cox, this means that (...) most members of the Washington foreign policy elite do tend to see themselves as masters of a larger universe in which America has a very special part to play by virtue of its unique history, its huge capabilities and accumulated experience of organizing the world for the last 50 years. (2003, 21) The rise of the United Sates as a "crusader state" (McDougall 1997) is not a totally new development. It is rooted in a long history of idealism in the American foreign policy that goes back to the Founding Fathers (Cox 2003, 8) . However, since Ronald Reagan's use of American ideology as a powerful foreign policy tool against the Soviet Union, the world had not seen anything like the present strong idealist imprint of George Bush's War on Terror.
35 This time, however, the perceived security threat does not come from a communist totalitarian regime but from a rather disperse global network of Islamic extremists backed by a handful of "rogue" states with weapons of mass destruction.
Goldstein and Keohane asserted that ideas "and the principled or causal beliefs they embody" provide "road maps" for political action. According to them, "these conceptions of possibility or world views are embedded in the symbolism of a culture and deeply affect modes of thought and discourse" (1993, 8) . Similarly, the present argument claims that the Bush government's approach to the global HIV/AIDS crisis is deeply embedded in this world view that understands the US as a special nation with global responsibilities. You know, the world looks at us and says, they're strong. And we are; we're strong militarily. But we've got a greater strength than that. We've got a strength in the universality of human rights and the human condition. It's in our country's history. It's ingrained in our soul. And today we're going to describe how we're going to act -not just talk, but act, on the basis of our firm beliefs ( The influence of evangelical Christians in the President's decision to set up an HIV/AIDS global plan should also be added to the equation. Influential evangelical lobby groups are behind the selective way the money is allocated to HIV/AIDS programs in target states. 41 At least one third of the PEPFAR's US$ 15 billion is earmarked for projects that stress abstinence until marriage as the primary preventive measure against the epidemic. 42 The other two principles, which stand for the so-called "ABC strategy", are "be faithful" and "condoms".
In states financially supported by the US, assistance to HIV/AIDS programs is attached to these moral strings. In this respect, transnational HIV/AIDS activists are very important instruments of norm diffusion. Although many times lacking material and economic power to make a difference, networks of activists promote norm change and adaptation by globally disseminating ideas, information and strategies (Florini 1999) . As Keck and Sikkink (1998) have noted, they are also important actors in promoting norm implementation at the state It discusses internationally and tries to apply nationally the outcomes of its debates by lobbying governments at the domestic level and by disseminating information to other networks of NGOs. ICASO is an interesting example of a transnational channel for the transmission of the HASN that works in both directions, bringing ideas and experiences from the grassroots level to the international system and also promoting policy outcomes emanating from HASN decision-making centres back to recipient states. In most cases, instead of using its own embassies and international assistance agencies, the US government takes on these networks to actually implement its HIV/AIDS policies abroad. 55 The funds are allocated to them either directly by US government agencies, such as the USAID, or indirectly by multilateral agencies and other international partners.
Transnational Additionally, there is a wide range of smaller international NGOs moving between the two groups. As the securitization of HIV/AIDS went into motion, they were attracted by the new funding mechanisms put in place by the GF and the PEPFAR. These organizations saw in the massive influx of cash to HIV/AIDS programs an opportunity to "stay in business" and expand their activities. 57 Whatever humanitarian motives may have caused their creation, these NGOs have to generate surpluses to stay active. This means that their financial needs sometimes precede any prior commitments to certain policy principles, as in the case of NGOs that are reducing their condom distribution programs to qualify for PEPFAR money.
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Going beyond the idea that "transnational civil society actors matter" in international politics, what the particular phenomenon of HIV/AIDS transnational activism shows is that these actors are not always autonomous sources of normative change in international relations. They can also be instrumentally co-opted by powerful states interested in using them to advance their foreign policy objectives. Therefore, the puzzle here has been to differentiate empirically between the political agendas and policy processes of HIV/AIDS transnational NGOs from the ones of states and multilateral institutions. The above evidence suggests, however, that these boundaries are far from being unambiguous. As in a conveyor belt, they promote normative change by transmitting norms from the international system to states and vice-versa.
The study also focused on the role of the United States as a powerful actor in undergoing international normative change. It was shown that material and ideational motivations, derived from deep-rooted worldviews and interests, shaped the particular way the US administration interpreted and reacted to the global epidemic. The US administration's approach to HIV/AIDS suggested that the limits between the process of politicization and securitization are not easy to assess. As already noted, the move towards securitization taken by the Bush administration was counterbalanced by the desecuritization bias of evangelical groups. These religious organizations lobbied against Buzan, Waever, and Wilde affirmed that for an issue to be successfully securitized, a "significant audience" should be persuaded to be afraid of the threat. However, what the above suggests is that securitization initiatives, as in the case of the PEPFAR, do not necessarily depend on people being convinced about the emergency security threat posed by the epidemic. As noted previously, the President's HIV/AIDS plan was mainly justified on the grounds of religious compassion and of an allegedly moral mission in the foreign policy of the United States.
In the same way, the relatively recent creation of special HIV/AIDS bureaucracies and policies at the system, regional and state levels indicates that the aforementioned pendulum has moved towards the institutionalization of the security threat. Nevertheless, it does not mean that a significant world audience was convinced about the emergency threat posed 
Notes
1 The concept of transnational advocacy networks is from Keck and Sikkink (1998) .
2 At a first glance, the concept of international regime would sound analytically more comprehensive than the concept of international norm. For example, Stephen Krasner provides a definition of international regime which encompasses a "set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given-area of international relations " (1982:186) . However, in Krasner's formulation, regime is not a single concept but a set of blurry terms, consisting of norms, principles, beliefs, rules and procedures that are really hard to cope with when applied to specific empirical cases. Therefore, to avoid intangible definitional complexities, the present study opted for a minimalist conceptualisation of the HASN in terms of an internationally agreed normative/prescriptive framework promoted with the help of states, IOs and transnational advocacy networks.
3 Consistent with scholarship on the field of international relations, this article accepts Krasner's definition of norms as "standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations" (1982:186) . It is different from rules that comprise the application of norms to particular situations (Cortell and Davis Jr., 1996:452) . For the purposes of this study, the subsequent discussion conveys in a single definition the above understandings of norms and rules.
4 Cortell and Davis Jr. (2000) pointed to "two waves" in the scholarship on international norms. Amitav Acharya (2004) also acknowledged this division in the literature.
5 The idea of international organizations working as "teachers of norms" is from Finnemore (1993) . There are a number of other concepts to define the role played by transnational actors in promoting norms, such as "norm entrepreneurs", "norm leaders", "norm maker/norm taker" etc. For examples, see Keck and Sikkink (1998) , Checkel (1998) and Naldeman (1990) .
6 For a useful review of this literature see Cortell and Davis Jr (2000) .
7 Acharya (2004:242) , for example, called "moral cosmopolitanism" the process whereby international norms are promoted as "universal" and not subjected to resistance or contestation.
8 They are also blamed for failing to grasp the forms by which norm entrepreneurs sometimes manipulate international norms to serve their own particularistic interests (Barnett, 1999; Joachim, 2003; Carpenter, 2005) .
9 Buzan, Waever, and Wilde (1998:27-28) note that this process is clearest in the military sector, where the enduring perception of threats, such as internal strife and external invasion, demand the build-up of strong bureaucracies.
10 For more on this, see, for example, "Stop denying the killer bug", The Economist, 21 February 2002.
11 A comprehensive examination of the domestic incorporation of the HASN in South Africa is beyond the scope of this article. In his doctoral thesis, however, the author developed an extensive analysis of the impact of the HASN on the domestic structure of three Southern African states (South Africa, Mozambique and Botswana), as well as on the regional structure of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). bpsr 171 12 Some neorealist authors are more optimistic about the prospects for cooperation among states. They reject the assumption that states find themselves in a condition of perennial conflict, arguing that there are certain situations in which states seek cooperation rather than competition. See, for example, Glaser (1994/95) . Authors linked with the neo-liberal school in international relations have also questioned some neorealist assumptions about international security. Contrary to the neo-realist view, these writers believe that international institutions can provide the regulatory means for improved security cooperation between states. For more on this literature, see Keohane and Nye (1977) , Keohane (1984) and Keohane and Martin (1995) .
13 According to Buzan, however, international security studies should focus on the latter two levels because security means the protection of human collectivities rather than individual human beings (Buzan, 1991: 50-51 ).
14 Theoretically, the human security approach is connected with social constructivist literature in international relations. This school of thought posits that ideas rather than power shape the relations between states (Wendt, 1992) . Social constructivists, such as Alexander Wendt, for example, would focus their analyses on the ideational move away from traditional narrow understandings of national security to a more comprehensive notion of human security. For them, this move illustrates the power of ideas in shaping international relations.
15 In 1999, a group of states with human security policies launched The Human Security Network. It is currently made up of Austria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland, Thailand and South Africa. For more on this, see: http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/.
16 Writers from a plethora of disciplines, such as economics, social policy, anthropology and development studies have also addressed the special and multifaceted impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on the social, political, economic and cultural structures of societies, states and regions. See, for example, Bloom and Godwin (1997) ; Barnett and Whiteside (2002); Campbell (2003) ; Hunter (2003) ; Holden (2003) ; Kauffman and Lindauer (2004) .
17 In some African countries, HIV prevalence among armed personnel is estimated to be as high as 40% to 60% (Elbe, 2002 (Elbe, , 2006 .
18 Stefan Elbe (2001) first acknowledged this division on the security interpretations of HIV/ AIDS.
19 The political climate in the US during the 1980s took a conservative turn with the election of Ronald Reagan. Family and religious values were strongly emphasised as indispensable components of society's cohesion (Ostergard, 2002:338) .
20 In the years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs laid off staff in 70 positions. Consulates in important African states were closed, as in the case of Kenya, Cameroon and Nigeria. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) reduced the staff in its African wing by 30% (Michaels, 1992) .
21 These questions started being asked systematically in the academic literature as well as in political circles only about 6 or 7 years ago. 31 Foucault (1980:115) describes a normative collection of rules, or "discursive knowledge", which are produced in the service of modern institutions and have the character of truth. For more on this, see also Clegg (1994) .
billion in 2004. The Global Fund believes that US$ 38 billion per year will be needed by 2015 to close the gap in health in the world's poorest countries (Global Fund, 2005b 44 Prostitution is not considered a crime in Brazil and prostitutes are a very organised group with many associations throughout the country. Brazilian public health officials work in coordination with prostitutes' associations in condom education and promotion (Phillips, M. M. and Moffet, 2005) .
45 Robert Jervis (1976) addressed the problem of misperceptions as a major psychological factor in foreign policy decision-making.
46 "The End of the Beginning?" The Economist, 15 July 2004.
47 Several notions have been employed to define transnational civil society actors. For some useful distinctions, see, for example, Florini (1999) , Khagram, Riker and Sikkink (2002) . It refers here to "self-organized advocacy groups that undertake voluntary collective action across state borders in pursuit of what they deem the wider public interest" (Price, 2003:580) .
48 For a comprehensive review of international relations scholarship on the emergence of transnational advocacy in world politics, see Price (2003) .
49 Drawing upon David Snow's concept of "frame alignment", Keck and Sikkink noted that to influence broad audiences "network members actively seek ways to bring issues to the public agenda by framing them in innovative ways ... sometimes they create issues by framing old problems in new ways; occasionally they help transform other actors' understandings of their identities and their interests" (1998:17).
50 Except for the special case of the global superpower.
51 Keck and Sikkink (1998) , for example, usefully explore the impact of transnational civil society groups in world politics. The authors set up a list of goals these actors pursue and the strategies they deploy to achieve them.
